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Abstract. This paper proposes a generalization of the Kripke semantics of intuitionistic logic
IL appropriate for intuitionistic Łukasiewicz logic IŁL – a logic in the intersection between IL and
(classical) Łukasiewicz logic. This generalised Kripke semantics is based on the poset sum construc-
tion, used in [2] to show the decidability (and PSPACE completeness) of the quasiequational theory
of commutative, integral and bounded GBL algebras. The main idea is that w  ψ – which for IL is
a relation between worlds w and formulas ψ, and can be seen as a function taking values in the
booleans (w  ψ) ∈ B – becomes a function taking values in the unit interval (w  ψ) ∈ [0, 1].
An appropriate monotonicity restriction (which we call sloping functions) needs to be put on such
functions in order to ensure soundness and completeness of the semantics.
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1. Introduction
In [2], Bova and Montagna study the computational complexity of the proposi-
tional logic GBLewf – a common fragment of intuitionistic logic and Łukasiewicz
logic. We will refer to this logic as intuitionistic Łukasiewicz logic IŁL. The orig-
inal name GBLewf derives from the fact that this logic has a sound and complete
algebraic semantics based on commutative (exchange), integral (weakening) and
bounded (ex-falsum) GBL algebras. Bova and Montagna have shown that the con-
sequence problem for IŁL is PSPACE complete, by showing that the equational
and the quasiequational theories of commutative, integral and bounded GBL al-
gebras are PSPACE complete.
Their decision procedure relies on the construction of a particular commuta-
tive, integral and bounded GBL algebra (called poset sum) from any given poset.
The elements of the poset sum are particular monotone functions assigning fuzzy
values (in [0, 1]) to each element of the poset. In what follows we demonstrate
how this can be seen as a novel generalization of Kripke semantics adequate for
intuitionistic Łukasiewicz logic IŁL.
IŁL, viewed as a fragment of Łukasiewicz logic, acts as the nexus of several
important nominally ‘fuzzy’ logics, such as basic logic (BL), Gödel logic, and the
product logic. The Hilbert-style presentation of IŁL coincides with Hajek’s BL [6]
minus pre-linearity, and therefore behaves as the constructive (or intuitionistic)
Presented by Name of Editor; Received June 18, 2019
Studia Logica (2019) 82: ??–?? ©Springer 2019
2 A. Lewis-Smith, P. Oliva, E. Robinson
kernel of BL. As such, IŁL can also be viewed as a generalisation of intuitionistic
propositional logic. GBL structures, introduced by Montagna and Jipsen in [7],
can be regarded as a generalization of Heyting algebras, the standard algebraic
model for intuitionistic logic. In general GBL lacks the commutativity present in
BL and Heyting algebras, although nite GBL algebras are commutative (see [7]).
We pursue this connection between IŁL and intuitionistic logic in detail, but
with respect to a generalization of Kripke semantics [8]. This suggests a new way
to view many-valued logics in terms of relational semantics, as opposed to alge-
braic semantics. This development may be welcome considering the prevalence
of algebraic approaches in the area has distinguished it from the broader eld of
non-classical and substructural logics, many of which can be characterised both
algebraically and in terms of some variant of relational semantics.
In Section 1.1, we will start by revisiting the standard Kripke semantics for
propositional intuitionistic logic (with a view to generalise it) and introducing the
logic IL. Section 2 introduces the various algebras that we will use in the paper,
and discusses the algebraic semantics of IL. In Section 3, we present the gener-
alisation of Kripke semantics, which we shall call Bova-Montagna1 semantics, for
IŁL. In Section 3.1 we outline how this semantics is a natural generalization of the
Kripke semantics for intuitionistic logic. Sections 3.3 and 3.4 prove the soundness
and completeness of the semantics. Although there are several generalizations of
Kripke semantics in the literature, to our knowledge this particular generalization
is novel. Section 4 contains a discussion, from a categorical point of view, of the
relationship between algebraic semantics and Kripke semantics.
We anticipate that the methods presented here for constructing Kripke se-
mantics for sub-structural logics can be adapted to other logics extending IŁL and
might even suggest alternative proof methods for logics in the vicinity of BL and
GBL e.g. new tableaux dened out of accessibility relations of a Kripke model,
labelled systems making specic use of the forcing denition, or even extending
Negri’s approach in [13] for ‘sequents of rules’ out of poset sums. This is discussed
further in the nal section.
1.1. Intuitionistic logic IL
The formulas of intuitionistic logic are inductively dened from atomic formulas
(we use p, q, . . . for propositional variables), including ⊥, and the binary connec-
tives ψ ∧ χ, ψ ∨ χ and ψ → χ. We will refer to this language as L. Let us recall
the standard Kripke semantics for intuitionistic logic.
1The semantics we present has been extracted from Bova and Montagna’s denition of poset
sums ([2], Denition 2), which itself is based on the work of Jipsen and Montagna on ordinal sum
constructions [7].
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Definition 1.1 (Kripke structure, [8]). AKripke structure consists of a pairK =
〈W,K〉, whereW = 〈W,〉 is a partial order, and w K p is a binary relation
between worlds w ∈ W and propositional variables p satisfying the following
conditions:
(M) If w K p and v  w then v K p
(⊥) ¬(w K ⊥)
Definition 1.2 (Kripke semantics for L, [8]). Given a Kripke structure
K = 〈W,K〉
we extend the relation K to a relation between worlds and arbitrary L-formulas
as
w K ψ ∧ χ := w K ψ and w K χ
w K ψ ∨ χ := w K ψ or w K χ
w K ψ → χ := v K ψ implies v K χ, for all v  w
Using the above, one obtains an essential (and well-known) property charac-
terising the satisfaction of formulas in intuitionistic logic.
Proposition 1.3. The monotonicity property (M) holds for all L-formulas φ, i.e.
if w K φ and v  w then v K φ
1.2. Intuitionistic Łukasiewicz logic IŁL
The formulas of Łukasiewicz logic are inductively dened from atomic formulas,
including⊥, and the binary connectives ψ ∧χ, ψ ∨χ, ψ⊗χ and ψ → χ. We will
refer to this language as L⊗, since it extends the language L of intuitionistic logic
with a second form of conjunction ψ ⊗ χ.
Figure 1 gives a natural deduction system for intuitionistic (propositional)
Łukasiewicz logic IŁL. When we write a sequent Γ ` φ we are always assum-
ing Γ to be a nite sequence of formulas. Note that we have the structural rules of
weakening and exchange, but not contraction. Hence, the number of occurrences
of a formula in Γ matters, and one could think of the contexts Γ as multisets.
In particular, the rule → I removes one occurrence of φ from the context Γ, φ,
concluding φ → ψ from the smaller context Γ. This makes IŁL a form of ane
logic.
IŁL has a deduction theorem: the connective→ internalises the consequence
relation `, and ⊗ internalises the comma in the sequent:
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Ax
φ ` φ Γ ` ψ WΓ, φ ` ψ
Γ, φ, ψ,∆ ` χ
Ex
Γ, ψ, φ,∆ ` χ
Γ, φ ` ψ
→ I
Γ ` φ→ ψ
Γ ` φ→ ψ ∆ ` φ
→ E
Γ,∆ ` ψ
Γ ` φ ∆ ` ψ ⊗ I
Γ,∆ ` φ⊗ ψ
Γ, φ, ψ ` χ ∆ ` φ⊗ ψ ⊗ E
Γ,∆ ` χ
Γ ` φ Γ ` ψ
∧ I
Γ ` φ ∧ ψ
Γ ` φ1 ∧ φ2 ∧ E (i ∈ {1, 2})
Γ ` φi
Γ ` φi ∨ I (i ∈ {1, 2})
Γ ` φ1 ∨ φ2
Γ ` φ ∨ ψ ∆, φ ` χ ∆, ψ ` χ
∨ E
Γ,∆ ` χ
Γ, φ, φ→ ψ ` χ
DIV
Γ, ψ, ψ → φ ` χ
Γ ` ⊥ ⊥ E
Γ ` φ
Figure 1. Intuitionistic Łukasiewicz logic IŁL
Proposition 1.4. The following hold in any calculus with rules (Ax,→ I,→ E,⊗ I,
⊗ E):
1. Γ, ψ ` χ i Γ ` ψ → χ.
2. Γ, φ, ψ ` χ i Γ, φ⊗ ψ ` χ.
Since IŁL has the exchange rule, we can extend this to φ1, . . . , φn ` ψ i
φpi1 ⊗ . . . ⊗ φpin ` χ i ` (φpi1 ⊗ . . . ⊗ φpin) → χ i ` φpi1 → . . . → φpin → χ,
where pi is any permutation of {1, . . . , n}.
The natural deduction system IŁL is inspired by, and, as we will see in Propo-
sition 1.5, corresponds to, the Hilbert-style system GBLewf of [2]
(A1) φ→ φ
(A2) (φ→ ψ)→ ((ψ → χ)→ (φ→ χ))
(A3) (φ⊗ ψ)→ (ψ ⊗ φ)
(A4) (φ⊗ ψ)→ ψ
(A5) (φ→ (ψ → χ))→ ((φ⊗ ψ)→ χ))
(A6) ((φ⊗ ψ)→ χ))→ (φ→ (ψ → χ))
(A7) (φ⊗ (φ→ ψ))→ (φ ∧ ψ)
(A8) (φ ∧ ψ)→ (φ⊗ (φ→ ψ))
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(A9) (φ ∧ ψ)→ (ψ ∧ φ)
(A10) φ→ (φ ∨ ψ)
(A11) ψ → (φ ∨ ψ)
(A12) ((φ→ ψ) ∧ (χ→ ψ))→ ((φ ∨ χ)→ ψ)
(A13) ⊥ → φ
(R1) φ, φ→ ψ `GBLewf ψ
When we wish to stress the precise system in which a sequent Γ ` φ is derivable
we use the system as a subscript of the provability sign, e.g. Γ `IŁL φ.
Proposition 1.5. The natural deduction system IŁL (Figure 1) has the same deriv-
able formulas as the Hilbert-style system GBLewf of [2], and hence corresponds
to it in the following sense2
ψ1, . . . , ψn `IŁL φ i `GBLewf ψ1 → . . .→ ψn → φ
Proof. Left-to-right: The result follows by a simple induction on the structure
of the natural deduction proof once we have established that each instance of
a natural deduction rule translates to a theorem of GBLewf. We translate each
sequent φ1, . . . , φn ` χ to the formula [φ1, . . . , φn ` χ] = φ1 → . . .→ φn → χ,
and each rule
Θ1 . . .Θm
Ψ
to [Θ1] → . . . → [Θm] → [Ψ]. For example, (Ax) translates to φ → φ (A1) and
(→I) to (χ1 → . . . χn → φ → ψ) → χ1 → . . . χn → φ → ψ, which is also a
form of (A1).
The analysis of many of the other rules is simplied if we introduce a relation
between formulae:
φ ≤ ψ i `GBLewf φ→ ψ
Omitting mention of use of (R1), (A1) says that this relation is reexive, and (A2)
that it is transitive. We therefore view it as generating a partial order on its equiv-
alence classes. (A2) also implies that→ is antitone in its rst argument, and (A3),
(A5) and (A6) now imply that the relation is monotone in its last argument, and
that φ→ ψ → χ is equivalent to φ⊗ ψ → χ, ψ ⊗ φ→ χ and ψ → φ→ χ.
We can now derive the remaining rules fairly easily. For instance, consider the rule
(DIV). Using the deduction theorem for IŁL from Proposition 1.4 we can assume
that Γ is a single formula θ. We have to derive
(θ → φ→ (φ→ ψ)→ χ)→ (θ → ψ → (ψ → φ)→ χ)
2Note that we use ψ ⊗ χ where Bova and Montagna in [2] use ψ  χ
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in GBLewf. We work with the provability ordering on formulae just introduced.
θ → φ → (φ → ψ) → χ) is equivalent to θ → (φ ⊗ (φ → ψ)) → ξ, and by
(A8) plus monotonicity, implies (in fact is equivalent to) θ → (φ ∧ ψ) → ξ. The
commutativity of ∧ (A9) allows us to swap φ and ψ, i.e. θ → (ψ ∧ φ) → ξ. We
now reverse the steps, using (A7), we obtain θ → (ψ ⊗ (ψ → φ)) → ξ. Finally,
uncurrying (A6), gives us θ → ψ → (ψ → φ)→ ξ as desired.
Right-to-left: This follows by induction on the GBLewf derivation of ψ1 → . . .→
ψn → φ once we have shown that each of the axioms of GBLewf is a theorem of
IŁL. The only non-trivial case is (A8), which states (φ ∧ ψ) → φ ⊗ (φ → ψ),
and requires an application of DIV. We can show that φ ∧ ψ ` φ ⊗ (φ → ψ) is
derivable in IŁL as follows. First we show from (∧ E) that φ→ φ ∧ ψ ` φ→ ψ:
Ax
φ→ φ ∧ ψ ` φ→ φ ∧ ψ Axφ ` φ
→ E
φ→ φ ∧ ψ, φ ` φ ∧ ψ
Ax
φ ∧ ψ ` φ ∧ ψ
∧ E
φ ∧ ψ ` ψ
→ I` φ ∧ ψ → ψ
→ E
φ→ φ ∧ ψ, φ ` ψ
→ I
φ→ φ ∧ ψ ` φ→ ψ
We then use (DIV):
Ax
φ ∧ ψ ` φ ∧ ψ
∧ E
φ ∧ ψ ` φ
→ I` φ ∧ ψ → φ
Ax
φ ` φ
. . . → I
φ→ φ ∧ ψ ` φ→ ψ ⊗ I
φ, φ→ φ ∧ ψ ` φ⊗ (φ→ ψ)
DIV
φ ∧ ψ, φ ∧ ψ → φ ` φ⊗ (φ→ ψ)
→ I
φ ∧ ψ ` (φ ∧ ψ → φ)→ φ⊗ (φ→ ψ)
→ E
φ ∧ ψ ` φ⊗ (φ→ ψ)
Remark 1.6. We stress at this point that Proposition 1.5 does not imply that the
notions of logical consequence in IŁL and GBLewf coincide, but rather that these
two proof systems have the same set of derivable formulas. We have noted that
IŁL satises the deduction theorem in the form Γ, φ `IŁL ψ i Γ `IŁL φ → ψ.
But in the standard notion of consequence for Hilbert-style systems, Γ ` φ is
interpreted as “φ is derivable from axioms (A1)-(A13) + Γ using the cut rule (R1)”.
In this case formulas in Γ can be used multiple times to derive φ. This is reected
in the failure of the deduction theorem for GBLewf (φ⊗ φ is a consequence of φ,
but we do not have `GBLewf φ → φ ⊗ φ). Multiple uses of a hypothesis is not
allowed in Γ `IŁL φ as IŁL lacks contraction.
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2. Algebraic Semantics for GBLewf and IŁL
Before we introduce our Kripke semantics for IŁL, we remind the reader about
some standard algebraic semantics, for GBLewf and IŁL.
In total we will consider four dierent classes of algebras: lattice-ordered
monoids, residuated lattices, GBL algebras, and MV algebras.
Definition 2.1 (Commutative Lattice-ordered monoid). A structure A =
〈A,∧,∨,⊗, 1〉 is a commutative lattice-ordered monoid if
• 〈A,∧,∨〉 is a lattice
• 〈A,⊗, 1〉 is a commutative monoid
• ⊗ is monotonic increasing with respect to the lattice order on A.
There are a number of slightly dierent denitions of this concept in the lit-
erature, varying with the exact relationship required between the lattice and the
monoid structure. Our denition is weak. The most common denition has that
⊗ distributes over ∨, and some denitions have that ⊗ distributes over both ∨
and ∧.
Definition 2.2 (Residuated lattice). A structure A = 〈A,∧,∨,⊗, 1,→〉 is
called a residuated lattice if
• 〈A,∧,∨,⊗, 1〉 is a commutative lattice-ordered monoid
• x⊗ y ≤ z if and only if x ≤ y → z
Standard denitions of residuated lattice do not include the fact that ⊗ pre-
serves the lattice order. This, however follows from the residuation property:
Suppose x′ ≤ x, then since x ⊗ y ≤ x ⊗ y, x ≤ y → (x ⊗ y). Therefore
x′ ≤ y → (x⊗ y) and hence x′ ⊗ y ≤ x⊗ y.
From the categorical perspective, residuation is an adjunction. Any partial
order can be viewed as a category in which the hom-sets have at most one element.
The objects are the elements of the partial order and there is a morphism a→ b if
and only if a ≤ b. In this case the residuation property says exactly that ( )⊗ y `
y → ( ).
Definition 2.3 (GBL-algebra). A GBL algebra is a residuated lattice which sat-
ises the divisibility property3: if x ≤ y then y ⊗ (y → x) = x. This is equivalent
3Note that since y → x ≤ y → x, it is always the case that y⊗(y → x) ≤ x (this is the counit of
the adjunction dening residuation). The name “divisibility" property makes sense if one interprets
x⊗ y as multiplication x× y, and y → x as division x
y
. This is saying that if 0 ≤ x ≤ y ≤ 1 then
y × x
y
= x. Note that if y = 0 then x = 0 as well.
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to requiring that the residuated lattice satises the equation:
x⊗ (x→ y) = y ⊗ (y → x)
A GBL algebra is said to be commutative if ⊗ is a commutative operation.
A GBL algebra is said to be integral if 1 is the top element of the lattice, i.e. x ≤ 1
for all x ∈ A. In this case we also denote 1 by >.
A GBL algebra is said to be bounded if the lattice has a bottom element ⊥, i.e.
⊥ ≤ x for all x ∈ A.
From now on let us abbreviate “commutative, integral and bounded GBL algebras"
by simply writing GBLewf algebras – where ewf abbreviate exchange, weakening
and falsum.
GBLewf algebras provide an algebraic semantics for both GBLewf and IŁL.
For GBLewf, this is mentioned in various papers of Montagna et al, e.g. [2] says
“GBLewf is strongly algebraizable ... Its equivalent algebraic semantics is the va-
riety of commutative, integral and bounded GBL algebras". Let us formulate this
semantics of GBLewf, and describe the appropriate semantics for provability in
IŁL.
Definition 2.4 (Algebraic semantics for L⊗). Given a GBLewf algebra A =
〈A,∧,∨,⊗,>,⊥,→〉 and a mapping h : Atom → A from propositional vari-
ables to elements of A we can extend that mapping to mapping [[φ]]Ah ∈ A on all
formulas φ as
[[p]]Ah := h(p)
[[⊥]]Ah := ⊥
[[φ ∧ ψ]]Ah := [[φ]]Ah ∧ [[ψ]]Ah
[[φ ∨ ψ]]Ah := [[φ]]Ah ∨ [[ψ]]Ah
[[φ⊗ ψ]]Ah := [[φ]]Ah ⊗ [[ψ]]Ah
[[φ→ ψ]]Ah := [[φ]]Ah → [[ψ]]Ah
A sequent φ1, . . . , φn ` ψ is then said to be GBLewf-valid inA, if for any mapping
h : Atom→ A
[[φ1]]
A
h = > and . . . and [[φn]]Ah = > implies [[ψ]]Ah = >
A sequent φ1, . . . , φn ` ψ is said to be GBLewf-valid if it is GBLewf-valid in all
GBLewf algebras.
A sequent φ1, . . . , φn ` ψ is said to be IŁL-valid in A, if for any h : Atom→ A
[[φ1]]
A
h ⊗ . . .⊗ [[φn]]Ah ≤ [[ψ]]Ah
Kripke Semantics for Intuitionistic Łukasiewicz Logic 9
with the understanding that if the context Γ = φ1, . . . , φn is empty (n = 0) then
[[φ1]]
A
h ⊗ . . .⊗ [[φn]]Ah = >.
A sequent is said to be IŁL-valid if it is IŁL-valid in all GBLewf algebras.
Proposition 2.5. A sequent Γ ` ψ is IŁL-valid i it is provable in IŁL.
We note again that, even though the sequents of GBLewf and IŁL are given
dierent interpretations, these interpretations coincide for theorems, i.e. for se-
quents with empty context ` ψ.
Definition 2.6 (MV algebra). A bounded GBLewf algebra is called an MV algebra
if the negation map (¬x = x → ⊥) is an involution, i.e. (x → ⊥) → ⊥ = x, for
all x.
MV algebras, provide an algebraic semantics for (classical) Łukasiewicz logic.
Here we are interested in a particular MV algebra which we will use in our Kripke
semantics for IŁL:
Definition 2.7 (Standard MV-chain). For x ∈ [0, 1], let x := 1 − x. The
standard MV-chain, denoted [0, 1]MV, is the MV algebra dened as follows: The
domain of [0, 1]MV is the unit interval [0, 1], with the constants and binary oper-
ations dened as
> := 1
⊥ := 0
x ∧ y := min{x, y}
x ∨ y := max{x, y}
x⊗ y := max{0, x+ y}
x→ y := min{1, y − x}
Note 1. x ⊗ y is equivalent to max{0, x + y − 1}, and x → y is equivalent to
min{1, y − x+ 1}.
Lemma 2.8. Recall that we are using the abbreviation x := 1 − x. The following
hold in the standard MV-chain [0, 1]MV
(i) For all n ≥ 2, x1 ⊗ . . .⊗ xn = max{0, x1 + . . .+ xn}.
(ii) x1 ⊗ . . .⊗ xn ≤ xi, for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
(iii) if x ≤ y ∨ z and u⊗ y ≤ v and u⊗ z ≤ v then u⊗ x ≤ v.
(iv) If x ≤ y and u ≤ y → z then x⊗ u ≤ z.
(v) If x ≤ y and z ≤ w then x⊗ z ≤ y ⊗ w.
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(vi) If x ≤ y and v ⊗ y ≤ z then v ⊗ x ≤ z.
(vii) x⊗ (x→ y) = y ⊗ (y → x).
Proof. We prove (i) in detail, the other properties follow easily from the fact that
[0, 1]MV is an MV algebra. By induction on n.
Basis: n = 2. By Denition 2.7.
Induction Step: Assume the result holds for n > 2, we show
x1 ⊗ . . .⊗ xn ⊗ xn+1 = max{0, x1 + . . .+ xn + xn+1}
Indeed
x1 ⊗ . . .⊗ xn ⊗ xn+1 = (x1 ⊗ . . .⊗ xn)⊗ xn+1
D2.7
= max{0, x1 ⊗ . . .⊗ xn + xn+1}
IH
= max{0,max{0, x1 + . . .+ xn}+ xn+1}
(∗)
= max{0,min{1, x1 + . . .+ xn}+ xn+1}
(†)
= max{0, x1 + . . .+ xn + xn+1}
using that
(∗) max{0, a} = min{1, a}
(†) max{0,min{1, a}+ b} = max{0, a+ b}.
3. Kripke Semantics for IŁL
The Kripke semantics for IŁL that we propose is based on the poset sums construc-
tion of [2] (see Section 3.2 for more details). We rst need to dene a particular
class of functions a partial orderW = 〈W,〉 to the standard MV-chain:
Definition 3.1 (Sloping functions). LetW = 〈W,〉 be a partial order, and let
v  w := v  w and v 6= w. A function f : W → [0, 1] is said to be a sloping
function if f(w) > ⊥ implies ∀v  w(f(v) = >).
The above implies that if f : W → [0, 1] is a sloping function and f(w) < >
then ∀v ≺ w(f(v) = ⊥). That is, along any increasing chain w1 ≺ w2 ≺ . . . ≺
wn, there can only be at most one point i such that⊥ < f(wi) < >, and for j < i
we must have f(wj) = ⊥, and for j > i we must have f(wj) = >.
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Lemma 3.2. If f : W → [0, 1] and g : W → [0, 1] are sloping functions, then the
following functions are also sloping functions:
(f ∧ g)(w) := min{fw, gw}
(f ∨ g)(w) := max{fw, gw}
(f ⊗ g)(w) := max{0, fw + gw}
Proof. Let f, g be sloping functions. Let us consider each case:
• f ∧ g. Assume (f ∧ g)(w) > ⊥, i.e. min{fw, gw} > ⊥. This implies that
we have both fw > ⊥ and gw > ⊥. But since f and g are assumed to be
sloping functions, we get that ∀v  w(f(v) = >) and ∀v  w(g(v) = >),
from which it follows that ∀v  w(min{f(v), g(v)} = >).
• f ∨ g. Assume (f ∨ g)(w) > ⊥ i.e. max{fw, gw} > ⊥. This implies that
we have at least one of fw > ⊥ or gw > ⊥. In case fw > ⊥, f is a sloping
function by hypothesis, so we have ∀v  w(f(v) = >) from which it follows
∀v  w(max{f(v), g(v)} = >). The case of gw > ⊥ is similar.
• f ⊗ g. Assume (f ⊗ g)(w) > ⊥ i.e. max{0, fw + gw} > 0. This means
max{0, fw + gw} = max{0, f(w) + g(w) − 1} > 0; and hence f(w) +
g(w)−1 > 0. This implies that neither f(w) = ⊥ nor g(w) = ⊥, i.e. we have
both f(w) > ⊥ and g(w) > ⊥. Since both f(w), g(w) are sloping functions
by hypothesis ∀v  w(f(v) = >) and ∀v  w(g(v) = >). So ∀v  w
max{0, f(v) + g(v)− 1} = max{0,>+>− 1} = max{0,>+ 0} = >, as
desired.
Definition 3.3. A Bova-Montagna structure (or BM-structure) is a pair M =
〈W,BM〉whereW = 〈W,〉 is a poset, andBM is an inx operator (on worlds
and propositional variables) taking values in [0, 1]MV, i.e. (w BM p) ∈ [0, 1]MV,
such that for any propositional variable p the function λw.(w BM p) : W →
[0, 1] is a sloping function.
Definition 3.4. Let b·c be the usual “oor" operation on the standard MV-chain
[0, 1]MV, corresponding to the case distinction
bxc :=
{ > if x = >
⊥ if x < >
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which is known as the “Monteiro-Baaz ∆-operator”. Given a (not necessarily slop-
ing) function f : W → [0, 1] and aw ∈W , let us write binfcvw for the following
construction:
binfcvwf(v) := min{f(w), inf
vwbf(v)c}
where infvwbf(v)c is the inmum of the set {bf(v)c : v  w} ⊆ [0, 1].
Lemma 3.5. This denition of binfcvw can also be equivalently written as
binfcvwf(v) :=
{
f(w) if ∀v  w(f(v) = >)
⊥ if ∃v  w(f(v) < >)
and for any f : W → [0, 1] the function λw.binfcvwf(v) is a sloping function.
Proof. First let us show that this is an equivalent denition. Consider two cases:
Case 1. ∀v  w(f(v) = >). In this case infvwbf(v)c = > and hence
binfcvwf(v) = min{f(w),>} = f(w)
Case 2. ∃v  w(f(v) < >). In this case infvwbf(v)c = ⊥
binfcvwf(v) = min{f(w),⊥} = ⊥
In order to see that λw.binfcvwf(v) is a sloping function, assume that for some
w we have binfcvwf(v) > ⊥, and let w′  w. By denition we have that
∀v  w(f(v) = >), and hence f(w′) = > and ∀v  w′(f(v) = >), which
implies binfcvw′f(v) = >.
Definition 3.6 (Kripke Semantics for L⊗). Given a BM-structure
M = 〈W,BM〉
the valuation function w BM p on propositional variables p can be extended to
all L⊗-formulas as:
w BM ⊥ := ⊥
w BM φ ∧ ψ := (w BM φ) ∧ (w BM ψ)
w BM φ ∨ ψ := (w BM φ) ∨ (w BM ψ)
w BM φ⊗ ψ := (w BM φ)⊗ (w BM ψ)
w BM φ→ ψ := binfcvw((v BM φ)→ (v BM ψ))
where the operations on the right-hand side are the operations on the standard
MV-chain [0, 1]MV, and binfcvw as in Denition 3.4.
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Lemma 3.7. For any formula φ the function λw.(w BM φ) : W → [0, 1] is a
sloping function.
Proof. By induction on the complexity of the formula φ. The cases forψ∨ξ, ψ∧ξ
andψ⊗ξ follow directly from Lemma 3.2. The case forψ → ξ follows from Lemma
3.5.
We can now generalise the monotonicity property of intuitionistic logic to
intuitionistic Łukasiewicz logic IŁL:
Corollary 3.8 (Monotonicity). The following (generalised) monotonicity prop-
erty holds for all L⊗-formulas φ, i.e.
if v  w then (v K φ) ≥ (w K φ)
Proof. This follows from the observation that sloping functions are in particular
monotone functions.
Definition 3.9. Let Γ = ψ1, . . . , ψn. Consider the following denitions:
• We say that a sequent Γ ` φ holds in a BM-structureM (written Γ BMM φ)
if for all w ∈W we have
(w BM ψ1 ⊗ . . .⊗ ψn) ≤ (w BM φ)
• A sequent Γ ` φ is said to be valid under the Kripke semantics forL⊗ (written
Γ BM φ) if Γ BMM φ for all BM-structuresM.
We will prove that this semantics is sound and complete for IŁL, i.e. a sequent
Γ ` φ is provable in IŁL i it is valid in all BM-structures. But rst let us show
that the semantics presented above is a direct generalisation of Kripke’s original
semantics.
3.1. BM-structures generalise Kripke structures
Bova-Montagna structures generalise Kripke structures, i.e. Kripke structures are
a particular case of BM-structures, when the valuations w |= p ∈ [0, 1]MV are
always in the nite set {>,⊥}. These can then be identied with the Booleans.
Therefore, any Kripke structure K = 〈W,K〉 can be seen as a BM-structure
M = 〈W,BM〉, by dening
w BM p =
{ > if w K p
⊥ if w 6K p
for all w ∈ W and propositional variables p. Recall that L ⊂ L⊗, so any L-
formula is also an L⊗-formula.
14 A. Lewis-Smith, P. Oliva, E. Robinson
Theorem 3.10. For any Kripke structure K = 〈W,K〉 and corresponding BM-
structureM = 〈W,BM〉 we have that
w K φ i (w BM φ) = >
for all L-formula φ.
Proof. It is easy to check that, when restricted to Kripke structures, we have
(v BM φ) ∈ {>,⊥} for all formulas φ. Hence, the result above can be proven
by a simple induction on the complexity of the formula φ.
Basis: If φ is an atomic formulas the result is immediate.
Induction step: Suppose the result holds for all sub-formulas of φ:
Case 1. φ = ψ ∧ χ. We have:
w K ψ ∧ χ ≡ (w K ψ) and (w K χ)
(IH)⇔ (w BM ψ) = > and (w BM χ) = >
⇔ min{w BM ψ,w BM χ} = >
≡ (w BM ψ ∧ χ) = >
Case 2. φ = ψ ∨ χ. We have:
w K ψ ∨ χ ≡ (w K ψ) or (w K χ)
(IH)⇔ (w BM ψ) = > or (w BM χ) = >
⇔ max{w BM ψ,w BM χ} = >
≡ (w BM ψ ∨ χ) = >
Case 3. φ = ψ → χ. We have
(i) (v BM ψ) = > implies (v BM χ) = > i (v BM ψ)→ (v BM χ) = >
(ii) b(v BM ψ) → (v BM χ)c = (v BM ψ) → (v BM χ), i.e. the “oor
operation” is unnecessary, and binfcvw becomes the standard infvw oper-
ation.
Therefore:
w K ψ → χ ≡ ∀v  w((v K ψ) implies (v K χ))
(IH)⇔ ∀v  w((v BM ψ) = > implies (v BM χ) = >)
(i)⇔ ∀v  w((v BM ψ)→ (v BM χ) = >)
(ii)⇔ binfcvw((v BM ψ)→ (v BM χ)) = >
≡ (w BM ψ → χ) = >
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which concludes the proof.
3.2. BM-structures and poset sums
Recall that a poset sum (cf. [2, Def. 2] and [7]) is dened over a posetW = 〈W,〉,
as the algebraAW of signatureL⊗whose elements are sloping functions f : W →
[0, 1] and operations are dened as
(⊥)(w) := ⊥
(f1 ∧ f2)(w) := min{f1w, f2w}
(f1 ∨ f2)(w) := max{f1w, f2w}
(f1 ⊗ f2)(w) := max{0, f1w + f2w}
(f1 → f2)(w) :=
{
f1(w)→ f2(w) if ∀v  w(f1(v) ≤ f2(v))
⊥ if ∃v  w(f1(v) > f2(v))
Since f1 and f2 are sloping functions, we have that
∀v  w(f1(v) ≤ f2(v)) ⇔ ∀v  w((f1(v)→ f2(v)) = >)
Therefore, this last clause of the denition can be simplied to
(f1 → f2)(w) := binfcvw(f1(v)→ f2(v))
Definition 3.11 (Poset sum semantics for L⊗). Let W = 〈W,〉 be a xed
poset, and AW be the poset sum described above. Given h : Atom → AW an
assignment of atomic formulas to elements ofAW , any formula φ can be mapped
to an element [[φ]]h ∈ AW as follows:
[[p]]h := h(p) (for atomic formulas p)
[[⊥]]h := ⊥
[[φ ∧ ψ]]h := [[φ]]h ∧ [[ψ]]h
[[φ ∨ ψ]]h := [[φ]]h ∨ [[ψ]]h
[[φ⊗ ψ]]h := [[φ]]h ⊗ [[ψ]]h
[[φ→ ψ]]h := [[φ]]h → [[ψ]]h
A formula φ is said to be valid inAW under h if for every w ∈W
[[φ]]AWh (w) = >
(which is 1 in [0, 1]MV). A formula φ is said to be valid inAW if it is valid in AW
under h for any possible mapping h : Atom→ AW .
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Let us conclude this section by observing that given a poset sum AW (for
a poset W = 〈W,〉) and a mapping h : Atom → AW of atomic formulas to
elements of AW , we can obtain a BM structureMAW = 〈W,BMh 〉, by taking
w BMh p := h(p)(w)
recalling that h(p) : W → [0, 1] is a sloping function.
Proposition 3.12. Let AW be the poset sum overW , and h : Atom → AW be
a xed mapping of atomic formulas to elements of W . Let MAW be the BM-
structure dened above. Then, for any formula φ
w BMh φ = [[φ]]AWh (w)
Proof. The above can be shown by a straightforward induction on the complexity
of φ.
Therefore, one can always transform an interpretation of L⊗ formulas in a
poset sumAW into a Kripke semantics (on the Kripke frameW) for L⊗ formulas.
3.3. Soundness
Let us now prove the soundness of the Kripke semantics for IŁL.
Theorem 3.13 (Soundness). If Γ `IŁL φ then Γ BM φ.
Proof. By induction on the derivation of Γ ` φ. Assume Γ = ψ1, . . . , ψn and let
⊗Γ := ψ1 ⊗ . . . ⊗ ψn. Fix a BM-structureM = 〈W,BM〉 withW = 〈W,〉,
and let w ∈W .
(Axiom) Γ, φ ` φ. By Denition 3.9, we need to show:
w BM (⊗Γ)⊗ φ (D.3.6)≡ (w BM ψ1)⊗ . . . (w BM ψn)⊗ (w BM φ)
(L.2.8 (ii))
≤ w BM φ
(∧I) By IH we have (w BM ⊗Γ) ≤ (w BM φ) and (w BM ⊗Γ) ≤ (w BM ψ).
Hence
(w BM ⊗Γ) ≤ min{w BM φ,w BM ψ} ≡ w BM φ ∧ ψ
(∧E) By IH we have (w BM ⊗Γ) ≤ (w BM φ ∧ ψ), i.e.
(w BM ⊗Γ) ≤ min{w BM φ,w BM ψ}
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This implies both (w BM ⊗Γ) ≤ (w BM φ) and (w BM ⊗Γ) ≤ (w BM ψ).
(∨I) By IH we have (w BM ⊗Γ) ≤ (w BM φ). Therefore
(w BM ⊗Γ) ≤ max{w BM φ,w BM ψ} ≡ w BM φ ∨ ψ
(∨E) By IH we have
• w BM ⊗Γ ≤ max{w BM φ,w BM ψ}
• (w BM (⊗∆)⊗ φ) ≤ (w BM χ)
• (w BM (⊗∆)⊗ ψ) ≤ (w BM χ)
By Lemma 2.8 (iii), these imply (w BM (⊗Γ)⊗ (⊗∆)) ≤ w BM χ.
(→I) By IH we have (w BM (⊗Γ) ⊗ φ) ≤ (w BM ψ), for all w ∈ W . By the
adjointness property we get
(w BM ⊗Γ) ≤ (w BM φ)→ (w BM ψ)
for all w ∈ W . Fix w ∈ W , and let us consider two cases. First, if for some
v  w we have (v BM φ) → (v BM ψ) < >, then we must have that
(v BM ⊗Γ) < >, and hence (w BM ⊗Γ) = ⊥, and trivially
(w BM ⊗Γ) ≤ binfcvw((v BM φ)→ (v BM ψ))
If on the other hand, (v BM φ)→ (v BM ψ) = > for all v  w, then
binfcvw((v BM φ)→ (v BM ψ)) = (w BM φ)→ (w BM ψ)
and we indeed have (w BM ⊗Γ) ≤ (w BM φ)→ (w BM ψ).
(→E) By IH we have
• (w BM ⊗Γ) ≤ w BM φ
• (w BM ⊗∆) ≤ binfcvw((v BM φ)→ (v BM ψ))
We again consider two cases. First, if for some v  w we have (v BM φ) →
(v BM ψ) < >, then
binfcvw((v BM φ)→ (v BM ψ)) = ⊥
and hence (w BM ⊗∆) = ⊥ and (w BM (⊗Γ) ⊗ (⊗∆)) ≤ w BM ψ. If on
the other hand, (v BM φ)→ (v BM ψ) = > for all v  w, then
binfcvw((v BM φ)→ (v BM ψ)) = (w BM φ)→ (w BM ψ)
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so that our assumption is (w BM ⊗∆) ≤ (w BM φ) → (w BM ψ). By
Lemma 2.8 (iv) we obtain (w BM (⊗Γ)⊗ (⊗∆)) ≤ w BM ψ.
(⊥E) By IH we have (w BM ⊗Γ) ≤ w BM ⊥. Since (w BM ⊥) = 0, we have
that (w BM ⊗Γ) = 0, which implies (w BM ⊗Γ) ≤ (w BM φ), for any φ.
(⊗I) By IH (w BM ⊗Γ) ≤ w BM φ and (w BM ⊗∆) ≤ w BM ψ. By Lemma
2.8 (v) we have
(w BM ⊗Γ)⊗ (w BM ⊗∆) ≤ (w BM φ)⊗ (w BM ψ)
and hence
(w BM (⊗Γ)⊗ (⊗∆)) ≤ (w BM φ⊗ ψ)
(⊗E) By IH we have
• (w BM ⊗Γ) ≤ (w BM φ)⊗ (w BM ψ)
• (w BM ⊗∆)⊗ (w BM φ)⊗ (w BM ψ) ≤ w BM χ
By Lemma 2.8 (vi), we have
(w BM ⊗Γ)⊗ (w BM ⊗∆) ≤ w BM χ
i.e. (w BM (⊗Γ)⊗ (⊗∆)) ≤ w BM χ.
(DIV) It is sucient to show that
w BM (φ→ ψ)⊗ φ ≤ w BM (ψ → φ)⊗ ψ
i.e.
(w BM φ→ ψ)⊗ (w BM φ) ≤ (w BM ψ → φ)⊗ (w BM ψ)
We consider two cases:
Case 1. w BM φ = ⊥. In this case the result is immediate.
Case 2. w BM φ > ⊥. This implies that ∀v  w(w BM φ = >), and hence
∀v  w((w BM ψ → w BM φ) = >), so
w BM ψ → φ = (w BM ψ)→ (w BM φ)
Since
w BM φ→ ψ, φ ≤ ((w BM φ)→ (w BM ψ))⊗ (w BM φ)
it remains to show that
((w BM φ)→ (w BM ψ))⊗ (w BM φ)
≤ ((w BM ψ)→ (w BM φ))⊗ (w BM ψ)
which follows from Lemma 2.8 (vii).
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3.4. Completeness
We conclude this section by arguing that the Kripke semantics above is also com-
plete, referring to Proposition 3.12 which relates poset sums and BM-structures,
and the completeness results of Jipsen and Montagna [7] and Bova and Montagna
[2] for poset sums and GBLewf algebras.
Theorem 3.14 (Completeness). If Γ BM φ then Γ `IŁL φ.
Proof. Let Γ ≡ ψ1, . . . , ψn. Suppose
Γ 6`IŁL φ
By Proposition 1.5 it follows that
6`GBLewf ψ1 → . . .→ ψn → φ
By the algebraic completeness result for GBLewf algebras with respect to the proof
system GBLewf (cf. Section 2), it follows that for some GBLewf algebra G and some
mapping h : Atom→ G from propositional variables to elements of G, we have
[[ψ1 → . . .→ ψn → φ]]Gh 6= >
By ([2, Theorem 1] – see also [7]) there exists a nite posetW = 〈W,〉 and an
assignment h′ : Atom → [0, 1] of atomic formulas to elements of the poset sum
AW , such that for some w ∈W
[[ψ1 → . . .→ ψn → φ]]AWh′ (w) 6= >
By Proposition 3.12, we have a BM-structureMAW such that for some w ∈W
(w BMh′ ψ1 → . . .→ ψn → φ) 6= >
and hence
(w BMh′ ψ1 ⊗ . . .⊗ ψn) 6≤ (w BM φ)
and ψ1, . . . , ψn 6BM φ.
Note 2. It would be interesting to be able to prove this completeness result di-
rectly, by constructing a BM-structure directly from the logic (term model), as is
done for intuitionistic logic. However, we have not been able to nd such direct
proof, and hence have appealed to Bova and Montagna results on the complete-
ness of GBLewf for poset sums.
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4. Algebraic and Kripke Models
Part of the thesis of this paper is that the Bova-Montagna semantics for GBLewf
can be viewed as a generalisation of the Kripke semantics for intuitionistic logic.
In this section we discuss how this ts into a general framework alongside the
algebraic semantics and models, by showing how the Kripke semantics construc-
tion above is in fact an instance of a more general construction on GBLewf algebras
(cf. Theorem 4.10).
Many logics have algebraic semantics. Propositions of the logic form an alge-
bra, with logical consequence giving a partial order and logical equivalence giv-
ing equality. Connectives are interpreted by algebraic operations and the algebras
themselves form a variety characterised by an equational theory. The logics we
consider have algebras that are lattices, and inequalities can be reduced to equa-
tions via equivalences such as
a ≤ b i a ∧ b = a
Examples of this include Boolean algebras for classical logic, Heyting algebras
for intuitionistic logic, MV algebras for Lukasiewicz logic and GBLewf algebras for
GBLewf. In each case the algebras are sound and complete for the logic.
In Section 1.1 we characterised Kripke models as being given by a Kripke struc-
ture. The key point of this is that we have a binary relation between worldsw and
propositional variables p. We can recast this as a function (·) K p : W → {0, 1},
and then generalise it to (·) K p : W → A, where A is a suitable algebra. We
will not consider the possibility that A depends on w ∈ W . This gives a theory
in which propositions are modelled as elements of AW . Since algebras of a given
kind form a variety,AW is an algebra of the same kind asA, and the interpretation
of all the operations is pointwise.
However, in the standard Kripke theory there is a partial order on W , and the
functions that interpret propositions must preserve that partial order. We want
to turn the set of monotone increasing functions W → A into an algebra. If the
operators in the algebra are themselves monotone increasing (isotone), then this
is not a problem. The set of isotone operators is a subalgebra ofAW . In particular:
Lemma 4.1. Let A = 〈A,∧,∨,⊗, 1〉 be a lattice-ordered monoid. Then for any
partial orderW = 〈W,〉, the set of isotone functions Inc(W,A) is also a lattice-
ordered monoid, in which the operations are calculated pointwise.
Constructs like residuation break this construction as they give rise to oper-
ators that are not isotone. Residuation x → y is antitone in its rst variable x,
while isotone in its second variable y. But we can nevertheless obtain a residu-
ated lattice. The residuations are not calculated pointwise. They are calculated as
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suitable reections in the categorical sense. When we view partial orders as cat-
egories, then functors are exactly isotone functions, and natural transformations
exactly the standard order relation between functions.
Lemma 4.2. If A = 〈A,∧,∨〉 is a complete lattice and W = 〈W,〉 a partial
order, then the inclusion Inc(W,A)→ AW has a right adjoint r. In other words,
Inc(W,A) is a reective subcategory of AW .
Proof. If f : W → A then (rf)(w) = ∨w′w fw′.
In particular, if A = {⊥,>}, the standard booleans, then this means
(rf)(w) = > i ∀w′  w (f(w′) = >).
Lemma 4.3. If A = 〈A,∧,∨,⊗, 1,→〉 is a complete residuated lattice, andW =
〈W,〉 is a partial order, then Inc(W,A) is also a residuated lattice.
Proof. We have already seen that Inc(W,A) is a lattice-ordered monoid. It is
therefore sucient to show that it is residuated. We recall that the denition of
residuation says that y → ( ) is the right adjoint of ( ) ⊗ y. Given monotone
g : W → A, there is an adjunction between Inc(W,A) and AW
Inc(W,A) AW AW
i
⊥
( )⊗g
⊥
r g→( )
in which the left adjoint is λf.(λw.fw ⊗ gw) and the right adjoint is
λH.r(λw.gw → Hw)
(we apply r to the functor calculated pointwise). The left adjoint factors through
the inclusion i : Inc(W,A) → AW , and hence we can restrict this adjunction to
the one we require on Inc(W,A).
In the case that ⊗ = ∧ we have the standard Kripke denition of implication
for models of intuitionistic logic. One should note, however, that while the point-
wise interpretation preserves all equations between terms, this new interpretation
does not. An example is ¬¬x = x, where ¬x is dened as x→ ⊥. This is true in
{⊥,>} but false in non-trivial Kripke models.
Example 4.4. Let W = {u, v}, with v  u, and let A be the boolean lattice
A = {>,⊥}. Take f : W → {⊥,>}, where fu = ⊥ and fv = >. Pointwise in
A we indeed have ¬¬x = x. But ¬f : W → A is
(¬f)(w) = ∀w′  w (f(w′) = ⊥)
Hence, (¬f)(u) = (¬f)(v) = ⊥ so that (¬¬f)(u) = > 6= f(u).
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One would expect, and even wish for, the Kripke construction to invalidate
classical logic – in the form of double negation elimination. However, the new
interpretation also breaks the divisibility property:
Example 4.5. Monotone functions do not necessarily have the divisibility prop-
erty. Take W = {u, v} as in the previous example, and consider monotone func-
tions to the standard MV-chain. Take f(u) = f(v) = 1/4 and g(u) = 1/2,
g(v) = 3/4. Then f ≤ g pointwise and
g(v)→ f(v) = min(1, 1/4− 3/4 + 1) = 1/2
while
g(u)→ f(u) = min(1, 1/4− 1/2 + 1) = 3/4
so (g → f)(w) = infw′w(gw → fw) is the constant 1/2 function. Therefore
(g ⊗ (g → f))(u) = max(0, 1/2 + 1/2− 1) = 0
but (f ⊗ (f → g))(u) = f(u)⊗ (f → g)(u) = 1/4⊗ 1 = 1/4.
Since isotone functions do not have the divisibility property, we have to look at
a dierent class of functions if we are to construct a GBLewf algebra. One suitable
class is the class of sloping functions.
Lemma 4.6. LetW be a partial order andA a complete bounded lattice. Let ( ) · ( )
be a binary operator on A such that
x · > = > x · ⊥ = ⊥
> · x = > or ⊥ · x = ⊥
⊥ · ⊥ = ⊥ > · > = >
Let f and g be two sloping functions W → A, then (f · g)(w) = fw · gw is also
a sloping function W → A.
Proof. Let us rst assume ( ) · ( ) has the three properties on the left. Suppose
(f · g)(w) is neither > nor ⊥. Then neither fw nor gw is > and at least one of
them is not ⊥, say fw. Then, by the assumption that f is a sloping function, for
all w′  w, fw′ = >, and hence (f · g)(w′) = fw′ · gw′ = >. The argument is
similar when we assume that ( ) · ( ) has the three properties on the right.
In any lattice, the meet ∧ and the join ∨ have one of these properties, and in a
commutative bounded lattice-ordered monoid so does ⊗. We can now construct
bounded lattice-ordered monoids as before.
Kripke Semantics for Intuitionistic Łukasiewicz Logic 23
Lemma 4.7. Let A = 〈A,∧,∨,⊗, 1 = >,⊥〉 be a commutative bounded lattice-
ordered monoid. Then for any partial orderW = 〈W,〉, the set of sloping func-
tions Step(W,A) is also a commutative bounded lattice-ordered monoid, and the
operations are calculated pointwise.
Once again, residuation gives rise to operators that are not isotone and hence
not sloping functions. As before we will use the reection of the sloping functions
in the lattice of all functions.
Lemma 4.8. LetW be a partial order and A a bounded lattice. Then the lattice of
sloping functionsW → A is a reective subcategory of the lattice of all functions
(or isotone functions), where the reection is given by binfc, where
(binfcf)(w) =
{
fw if ∀w′  w(fw′ = >)
⊥ if ∃w′  w(fw′ < >)
This now allows us to construct a bounded residuated lattice.
Lemma 4.9. If A = 〈A,∧,∨,⊗, 1 = >,⊥,→〉 is a bounded integral residuated
lattice andW is a partial order then Step(W,A) is also a bounded integral resid-
uated lattice.
In contrast to the isotone functions, the sloping functions are divisible.
Theorem 4.10. If A = 〈A,∧,∨,⊗, 1 = >,⊥,→〉 is a GBLewf algebra and W is a
partial order then Step(W,A) is also a GBLewf algebra.
Proof. Given the above lemmas, it remains for us to check the divisibility prop-
erty. Suppose f ≤ g for sloping functions f, g : W → A, and let w ∈ W . We
consider three cases:
1. If f(w) = >, then g(w) = >, and, moreover, for allw′  w, f(w′) = g(w′) =
>. Hence (g ⊗ (g → f))(w) = > = f(w).
2. If f(w) = ⊥, since g⊗(g → f) ≤ f , we have (g⊗(g → f))(w) = ⊥ = f(w).
3. If ⊥ < f(w) < >, then for all w′  w, f(w′) = g(w′) = >. In this case
(g → f)(w) = g(w)→ f(w). Hence
(g ⊗ (g → f))(w) = g(w)⊗ (g(w)→ f(w)) = f(w)
since A itself satises the divisibility property.
It is interesting to note that even if A is a involutive GBLewf algebra, it might
be that Step(W,A) is not an involutive GBLewf algebra. In particular, if we take
A to be the standard MV-chain, then this is the Bova-Montagna construction.
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5. Conclusion and Future Work
In the foregoing we have shown a certain generalization of Kripke semantics
based on the notion of poset sums dened in [2, 7] is adequate for intuition-
istic Łukasiewicz logic IŁL. Along the way, we have shown that the semantics
presented herein really does generalise Kripke semantics for intuitionistic logic
in various respects, e.g. monotonicity of valuations as in the case of intuition-
istic logic under Kripke models, with the domain of our semantics being that of
[0, 1]MV; the agreement between Kripke models and our own with respect to the
language of tensorless formulae.
From here there are several directions one could take. Identifying analytic cal-
culi for basic logic (BL) or generalised basic logic (GBL) considerably motivates
the present work. We conjecture that use can be made of [13] to internalise our
semantics so that we might obtain an analytic system. A key issue is whether
Negri and Von Plato’s approach can work for generalisations of Kripke semantics.
Fortunately, in [14] the authors have shown their approach is robust enough to
accommodate Routley-Meyer semantics for relevance logics such as R. This is a
good sign, as the Routley-Meyer semantics generalizes Kripke semantics and is
a popular, unifying semantics for many substructural logics (even if the motiva-
tion behind such semantics is still poorly understood). Perhaps as a worst-case
scenario, one might translate our semantics into Routley-Meyer’s and attempt to
internalise the semantics into the resulting sequent rules. This is less preferable
to the direct route of internalising poset sums into appropriate sequent rules.
Although indirect, there is some precedent for analysing many-valued log-
ics via the Routley-Meyer framework: Urquhart’s C, for example, has both an
algebraic semantics and a Routley-Meyer semantics [12]. Importantly, both are
adequate for C. Moreover, Urquhart’s C forms the tensorless fragment of BL and
admits an analytic hypersequent calculus presentation (see [3], [4]). Given these
latter insights and the family resemblance betweenBL,GBLewf, Łukasiewicz logic
and C – all many-valued logics lacking full-contraction, featuring well-explored
algebraic semantics adequate for the intended systems – this strongly suggests
that Von Plato and Negri’s approach can work for many-valued logics in this fam-
ily, for some appropriate generalisation of Kripke semantics.
Another research direction is to derive tableaux methods for IŁL from Bova-
Montagna’s poset sums as a point of departure. Presently, there’s a dearth of exis-
tent tableaux for innitely many-valued logics. BL and GBLewf are no exception
to this trend, with BL seeing progress recently. We know of two such approaches
with respect to BL. For example, using the fact that BL is the logic of continuous
t-norms [5], [6], Agnieszka Kułacka in [9] and [11] introduces a semantic tableau
calculus for BL that is sound and complete with respect to continuous t-norms,
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and demonstrates the refutational procedure and search for countermodels on se-
lect examples. These are, in a way, preceded by Olivetti’s own tableau calculi [15]
and connect with the relational hypersequents approach in [10] whose rules are
based on that of Łukasiewicz t-norms, although Kułacka’s approach in [9, 11] is
considerably more general (as it is a calculus adequate for any continuous t-norm).
Preceding Kułacka’s work, Bova and Montagna’s [1] features a calculus forBL not
only analytic but also invertible, and show that the tautology problem for BL is
coNP-complete.
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